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HHE Search Results
471 HHE reports were found based on your search terms. Reports are listed in order of year published with the most recently published reports listed first.
Year Published and Title
(2010) 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus exposure among internal medicine housestaff and fellows, University of Utah School of Medicine, Salt Lake City, Utah. (Click to open report) In August 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the director of the internal medicine residency program at UUSM concerning the exposure of internal medicine housestaff to the pH1N1 virus. A number of internal medicine housestaff were reportedly diagnosed with pH1N1 in June 2009, and more housestaff were reported to have ILI, leading to significant absenteeism in this program. The exact extent of the disease, risk factors leading to infection, and modes of transmission among the internal medic... (Click to show more)In August 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the director of the internal medicine residency program at UUSM concerning the exposure of internal medicine housestaff to the pH1N1 virus. A number of internal medicine housestaff were reportedly diagnosed with pH1N1 in June 2009, and more housestaff were reported to have ILI, leading to significant absenteeism in this program. The exact extent of the disease, risk factors leading to infection, and modes of transmission among the internal medicine housestaff were unknown at the time of the request. In August-September 2009, we performed a cross-sectional study to examine pH1N1 exposure; determine the prevalence of pH1N1 infection and ILI; identify modes of transmission; and identify risk factors for infection among the internal medicine housestaff, cardiology fellows, and pulmonary and critical care fellows who were in the program at any time from May 1-June 30, 2009. We also assessed knowledge, attitudes, and practices towards influenza infection control measures. We made a site visit to UUSM and the four associated medical centers in September 2009, to meet with housestaff, fellows, and staff members at each of the four medical centers to learn about their experience during the early 2009 pH1N1 pandemic. We found that most of the 88 responding physicians reported exposure to individuals with pH1N1 or ILI either at work or outside of work. Most respondents reported having contact with a patient with confirmed or probable pH1N1 or ILI but also reported contact with ill coworkers at work and outside of work. Thirteen cases of ILI, with five laboratory-confirmed diagnoses of influenza A, occurred in responding physicians in May-June 2009. Transmission likely occurred at work and outside of work. We concluded that all four medical centers were appropriately using the occupational health hierarchy of controls approach to prevent influenza transmission within their centers and to prevent exposure of healthcare personnel. Comprehensive programs were in place, and innovative methods of infection control had been implemented with respect to engineering and administrative controls. However, our survey results show some gaps in infection control knowledge, incomplete exclusion of ill housestaff and fellows from work, and gaps in adherence to PPE use. We recommend that the residency and fellowship programs have procedures for tracking ill and absent housestaff and fellows. The programs should also develop a written plan for staffing in the event of a pandemic or other emergency. Housestaff and fellows should be encouraged to self assess for symptoms. Housestaff and fellows with febrile respiratory illness should be excluded from work according to the most recent CDC guidance, found at <a href="https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/healthcaresettings.htm"target="_blank">https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/healthcaresettings.htm</a>. They should also be encouraged to avoid social events outside of work. Education and training of housestaff and fellows should be provided at least annually regarding the evaluation, diagnosis, treatment, and complications of patients with symptoms of influenza; the recommended isolation precautions at each of the four medical centers; proper hand hygiene; and the proper donning, use, and removal of recommended PPE. Housestaff, fellows, and all medical center employees should continue to be required to receive the annual seasonal influenza vaccine as part of the comprehensive influenza infection control strategy. The vaccine should be made available to all housestaff and fellows at their assigned medical centers. Signage indicating appropriate isolation precautions should be placed outside of patients' rooms concurrent with placement of patients in rooms. HCP entering the room of a patient in isolation precautions for influenza should be limited to those performing patient care activities. A respiratory protection program should be developed, implemented, and maintained for all housestaff and fellows to protect against airborne infectious agents. All housestaff and fellows should receive training, receive medical clearance, and undergo fit testing as specified in the OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard (29 CFR 1910.134). PPE, including gloves, gowns, surgical masks, N95 filtering facepiece respirators, and eye protection, should be made readily available near patient rooms according to hospital guidelines. PPE use should be emphasized when caring for critically ill and noncritically ill pH1N1 and ILI patients. The medical centers should ensure appropriate stockpiles of N95 respirators and other PPE in preparation for potential outbreaks of airborne infectious agents.
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(2010) Comparison of mold exposures, work-related symptoms, and visual contrast sensitivity between employees at a severely water-damaged school and employees at a school without significant water damage, Alcee Fortier Senior High School, New Orleans. (Click to open report) On January 18, 2005, NIOSH received a request for an HHE at AFSHS in New Orleans, Louisiana. Employees submitted the request because of concerns about exposure to mold and lead paint in their school building. Employees reported a variety of health effects, including difficulty breathing, chronic sinusitis, immune system problems, nosebleeds, skin rashes, irregular menses, headaches, irritable bowel syndrome, and nausea. We visited AFSHS on April 18-19, 2005. During informal interviews, employees... (Click to show more)On January 18, 2005, NIOSH received a request for an HHE at AFSHS in New Orleans, Louisiana. Employees submitted the request because of concerns about exposure to mold and lead paint in their school building. Employees reported a variety of health effects, including difficulty breathing, chronic sinusitis, immune system problems, nosebleeds, skin rashes, irregular menses, headaches, irritable bowel syndrome, and nausea. We visited AFSHS on April 18-19, 2005. During informal interviews, employees reported possible work-related symptoms, some of which were consistent with symptoms reported by people working in water-damaged buildings. The building had obvious microbial contamination, so we decided that further evaluation was needed. On May 23-24, 2005, we returned to New Orleans for a follow-up evaluation. During this visit we administered a work history and health symptom questionnaire. We also conducted VCS testing using the F.A.C.T. handheld chart. VCS testing measures the subjects' ability to determine changes in alternating light and dark bands of varying intensity. Performance on this test has been adversely associated with exposure to neurotoxins such as solvents and lead among many other conditions and exposures such as aging, certain eye conditions, alcohol and medication use, and depression. We used VCS testing for this evaluation to determine if it could serve as a biomarker of effect for occupants who experience adverse effects from a water-damaged building. We also collected environmental samples for culturable and aerosolized fungal spores and measured IEQ parameters (CO2, temperature, and RH). We performed a similar evaluation at WHHS in Cincinnati, Ohio, on February 27-29, 2006. WHHS had no history of ongoing water intrusion or mold growth. Of 119 employees at AFSHS, 95 (80%) participated in the evaluation. Of 165 employees at WHHS, 110 (67%) participated. Participants at both schools were similar in sex, age, history of psychiatric disease, atopy (the predisposition to allergic disease), smoking history, and having mold or moisture problems in their homes. Employees at AFSHS had higher prevalences of work-related cough, wheezing, or whistling in the chest; chest tightness; unusual shortness of breath; sinus problems; sore or dry throat; frequent sneezing; stuffy nose; runny nose; fever or sweats; aching all over; unusual tiredness or fatigue; headache; difficulty concentrating; confusion or disorientation; trouble remembering things; change in sleep patterns; and rash, dermatitis, or eczema on the face, neck, or arms than employees at WHHS. At each school, 13 employees reported currently having asthma. A significantly higher percent of the asthmatics at AFSHS reported their asthma was worse at work. Monocular and binocular VCS values were significantly lower at all spatial frequencies among AFSHS employees. A significantly higher percentage of employees at AFSHS had scores that fell below the average performance for 90% of the population compared to the results found among employees at WHHS. Actively growing Cladosporium was found on the walls of AFSHS. Mold was found in all three MSQPCR air samples with C. sphaerospermum being the most prevalent. The vacuum dust samples detected 32 of the 35 fungal species tested. The culturable air samples showed that Cladosporium and Pencillium were the most prevalent genera both inside and outside the school. Aspergillus species were detected in inside samples but not in outside air samples. The spore trap samples showed that Cladosporium was the prevalent genera both inside and outside the school with the exception of Room 316. No fungal growth was detected on six of eight sticky tape samples collected at WHHS. One had a trace of hyphae, and the other showed a few Aspergillus/Pencillium-like spores and a trace of hyphae. Both were from the band room. Air samples analyzed with MSQPCR showed low counts for inside samples compared to outside samples. The culturable and spore trap air samples collected inside and outside WHHS were comparable in terms of both counts and genera ranking. CO2 concentrations were elevated in some classrooms. We determined that a health hazard existed at AFSHS. Employees had significantly higher prevalences of rashes and nasal, lower respiratory, and constitutional symptoms than employees at WHHS. The prevalences of several neurobehavioral symptoms were also significantly higher. VCS values across all spatial frequencies were lower in the employees at AFSHS. Further studies are needed to determine what factors could be responsible for the VCS findings and whether they have any clinical significance for affected individuals. The building problems at AFSHS need to be addressed; recommendations to prevent water damage and microbial growth and for remediation in NOPS and WHHS are provided in this report.
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(2010) Exposure to tuberculosis among immigration employees, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detention and Removal Operations, Chicago, Illinois and Broadview, Illinois. (Click to open report) In January 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2718. The request concerned the potential for transmission of TB at the U.S. ICE BSSA facility in Broadview, Illinois. While no known cases of active TB had occurred among employees, the incidence of latent TB infection among employees was unknown. NIOSH investigators made an initial site visit to BSSA on April 8-9, 2009. We walked through the facility and observed work processes, practices... (Click to show more)In January 2009, NIOSH received an HHE request from the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2718. The request concerned the potential for transmission of TB at the U.S. ICE BSSA facility in Broadview, Illinois. While no known cases of active TB had occurred among employees, the incidence of latent TB infection among employees was unknown. NIOSH investigators made an initial site visit to BSSA on April 8-9, 2009. We walked through the facility and observed work processes, practices, and conditions. We spoke with employees about health and workplace concerns about TB and collected environmental and ventilation measurements. We also held confidential interviews with all 29 employees present at the facility. Most employees reported having daily direct contact with detainees, and none of the employees reported receiving general TB training, respirator fit testing, or respirator training during their employment at BSSA. Many employees were unaware of the ICE recommendation that they undergo periodic TB screening. We also learned that the return air from the detainee areas, including the isolation room, was recirculated throughout BSSA. In addition, all of the detainee areas, including the isolation room, were positively pressurized relative to the adjacent hallway and employee areas. Both situations result in air that was shared between employees and detainees, which could lead to an increased risk of exposure if airborne infectious agents (including Mycobacterium tuberculosis) are present. On July 10, 2009, NIOSH received a second HHE request from the American Federation of Government Employees, Local 2718 concerning the potential for transmission of TB at the ICE CDO in Chicago, Illinois. We made a second site visit to BSSA and an initial site visit to the CDO on August 10-12, 2009. During that visit, we walked through both facilities and observed work processes, practices, and conditions. We spoke with employees about TB-related health and workplace concerns and collected environmental and ventilation measurements. We also screened employees at both facilities for TB with both the TST skin test and QFT GIT blood test methods. At the CDO, the HVAC system in the detainee area is a constant air volume system that exhausts air directly out of the building without recirculation, which is an optimal design. However, the calculated ACH in the holding cells, processing area, and courtrooms were below those recommended by CDC. We also noted that the air flow movement between many of the holding cells and the processing area and between Courtroom B and a secure hallway was bidirectional. These deficiencies can increase the risk of exposure if airborne infectious agents (including Mycobacterium tuberculosis) are present. Most ICE employees participate in job activities that place them at risk of acquiring TB infection, including transporting and interviewing detainees and supervising court visits. Despite this, few participants reported having annual TB screening. Even when we offered TB screening on-site, the number of employees who returned for the TST reading and second step placement was low. All employees who underwent blood collection for the QFT-GIT completed screening. Our evaluation demonstrates the feasibility and practicality of the QFT-GIT as the preferred TB screening method among ICE employees who often have unpredictable schedules. We recommend that the Field Office Director and other local ICE supervisors familiarize themselves with ICE's existing tuberculosis exposure control plan and then develop plans specific for both BSSA and the CDO. A separate constant air volume HVAC system should be designed for BSSA to provide single-pass exhaust ventilation in the detainee holding cells, isolation room, and processing area. Negative pressure should be maintained in these areas relative to all adjacent administrative areas at BSSA. The HVAC system in the detainee areas at the CDO should be rebalanced to provide the appropriate ACH and air flow patterns to minimize the potential for transmission of TB. General training on TB should be provided annually to all employees. All employees should be made aware that annual TB screening is recommended and that it is offered at no cost through FOH. FOH should consider conducting on-site TB screening on predetermined dates and hours at BSSA and CDO and using IGRA testing instead of TST testing to improve participation rates. A respiratory protection program should be implemented for all employees to minimize the potential for transmission of TB. All employees should receive training and medical clearance, and undergo fit testing as defined in the OSHA Respiratory Protection Standard (29 CFR 1910.134).
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(2009) Cancer among occupants of two office buildings, NASA Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio. (Click to open report) On October 11, 2007, NIOSH received a request for an HHE from the management of the NASA GRC in Cleveland, Ohio, regarding ongoing employee and union concerns about a possible higher rate of cancer among current and former employees of Buildings 500 and 501. This was the second HHE request NIOSH had received regarding this issue. The first request, received in 2004, was also submitted by management. In response to the first request, NIOSH investigators identified no hazardous exposures and close... (Click to show more)On October 11, 2007, NIOSH received a request for an HHE from the management of the NASA GRC in Cleveland, Ohio, regarding ongoing employee and union concerns about a possible higher rate of cancer among current and former employees of Buildings 500 and 501. This was the second HHE request NIOSH had received regarding this issue. The first request, received in 2004, was also submitted by management. In response to the first request, NIOSH investigators identified no hazardous exposures and closed the HHE with a letter [NIOSH 2004]. In this latest request, NASA GRC management explained that cancer concerns had resurfaced, no cause for these cancers had been identified, and employees were concerned about potential exposure to jet fuel and deicing compounds from the nearby airport, asbestos in the buildings, water damage in the buildings, and general IEQ. This evaluation focused on the employees in Buildings 500 and 501, adjacent three-story brick office buildings constructed in the early 1960s. Building 500 has approximately 110,000 square feet of office space, and Building 501 has about 25,000 square feet; neither building has research labs. Both buildings are on the NASA GRC campus and across the road from the Cleveland Hopkins International Airport. We reviewed reports provided by NASA GRC management concerning asbestos remediation in these buildings, responses to complaints from building occupants, and environmental sampling during the past 14 years. We evaluated surveys about cancer diagnoses from current and former employees in Buildings 500 and 501 that were provided to us by LESA and NASA management. Additionally, a supervisor sent a confidential list of employees with cancer, and the NASA GRC human resources office provided a list of medical and regular retirements from the buildings during the past 5 years. We spoke with representatives from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency regarding any past or current environmental contamination issues involving Buildings 500 and 501. We also consulted with representatives from the Ohio Department of Health's cancer registry. We visited the site on October 7-8, 2008. On October 7, 2008, we held an opening meeting with representatives of management and LESA, then walked through the buildings, took measurements of IEQ comfort parameters, and looked for evidence of water damage, water incursion, visible mold, and other potential IEQ problems. On October 8, 2008, we gave two presentations to employees regarding the findings of our evaluation of the cancers reported among employees, and then had a closing conference with representatives of management and LESA. Twenty different types of cancer were diagnosed among employees of Buildings 500 and 501 since 1985. The most common types of cancer diagnosed were breast (17 cases), lung (7 cases), and prostate (4 cases), which are the three most common cancers in the United States. The other types of cancer diagnosed were melanoma, nonmelanoma skin cancer, colon, thyroid, bladder, pancreatic, cervical, uterine, head and neck, bile duct, brain, and stomach cancers; Hodgkin lymphoma, non-Hodgkin lymphoma, clear cell sarcoma, leukemia; and one unknown primary. We found that airport runoff of jet fuel and deicing fluid had entered the Rocky River, which runs next to Building 500. However, jet fuel and deicing fluids are not known to cause cancer, and the river was not a source of drinking water for building occupants, who are supplied with city water. Much of the asbestos in Buildings 500 and 501 had been removed over the years, but some was still managed in place and posed no hazard to building occupants. We identified minor IEQ problems, such as water damage to ceiling tiles and walls, and in some cases poor maintenance of fan coil units, but these are not associated with the cancers that were diagnosed among employees of Buildings 500 and 501. We found no evidence that the cancers reported are associated with work in Buildings 500 and 501 because the number and types of cancers do not appear unusual, the different types of cancers do not suggest a common exposure, no significant hazardous exposures were identified, and evidence leads to nonoccupational causes. Although we recommend no further investigation into the cancers reported in these buildings, employees may have concerns about their own risk for cancer. Therefore, management and the union should take this opportunity to encourage employees to learn about known cancer risk factors, measures they can take to reduce their risk for preventable cancers, and availability of cancer screening programs for certain types of cancer.
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(2009) Employees' chemical exposures while blending and repackaging glass beads for road markings, Weissker Manufacturing, Palestine, Texas. (Click to open report) On October 16, 2007, NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Weissker Manufacturing (Weissker) in Palestine, Texas. Employees were concerned about exposures to lead, arsenic, formaldehyde, and dust while handling reflective glass beads. Health problems listed on the request and attributed to the dust from the glass beads included glassy eyes, sore throat, body aches, and flu-like symptoms. Weissker imported the glass beads in Super Sack containers (2200-pound capacity fabric... (Click to show more)On October 16, 2007, NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Weissker Manufacturing (Weissker) in Palestine, Texas. Employees were concerned about exposures to lead, arsenic, formaldehyde, and dust while handling reflective glass beads. Health problems listed on the request and attributed to the dust from the glass beads included glassy eyes, sore throat, body aches, and flu-like symptoms. Weissker imported the glass beads in Super Sack containers (2200-pound capacity fabric bags) from Russia and China and repackaged the beads for resale. Both the Chinese and Russian glass beads had a silane coating. Employees complained about a fish-like odor emitted from the Chinese beads when they were wet. The odor may have come from the amines in the glass beads' coating. Weissker is no longer purchasing beads from China due to employees' health concerns. At the time of this evaluation six employees at Weissker worked one 8-hour shift. During our site visit on January 22-24, 2008, we observed the blending and repackaging process, reviewed the MSDSs for the glass beads, and interviewed employees. We also collected PBZ air samples for respirable dust, crystalline silica, elements (including arsenic and lead), and formaldehyde and GA air samples for total dust, formaldehyde, and elements. We analyzed bulk samples of glass beads for elements, VOCs, and size. We took wipe samples from employees' hands and work surfaces and had them analyzed for elements. Our review of the OSHA 300 Logs of Work-Related Injuries and Illnesses revealed that an employee was injured in June 2007, when his arm was trapped between a metal bin and a Super Sack while he was emptying it. All air sampling results were below applicable OELs. No VOCs were detected in the bulk samples of glass beads. Elements were either not detected or were detected at very low concentrations. Particle size analysis of the glass beads revealed that they were too large to be deposited in the respiratory tract or the lungs. We measured very low levels of elements on employees' hands, on work surfaces, and on the lunchroom table. We conducted confidential medical interviews with five employees; some reported eye and throat irritation. We recommend that employees wear safety glasses or goggles to prevent glass beads from getting in their eyes and that they wash their hands before eating or touching their face. We also recommend that employees not place their arms underneath the Super Sack containers when they are being emptied to prevent hand and arm injuries.
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(2009) Exposure to hazardous metals during electronics recycling at four UNICOR facilities, UNICOR, Elkton, Ohio; Texarkana, Texas; Atwater, California; and Marianna, Florida. (Click to open report) Introduction: On November 27, 2007, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a request for technical assistance from the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in their health and safety investigation of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (UNICOR) electronics recycling program at Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions in Elkton, Ohio; Texarkana, Texas; and Atwater, California. We were asked to assess the current medica... (Click to show more)Introduction: On November 27, 2007, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a request for technical assistance from the United States Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in their health and safety investigation of the Federal Prison Industries, Inc. (UNICOR) electronics recycling program at Bureau of Prisons (BOP) institutions in Elkton, Ohio; Texarkana, Texas; and Atwater, California. We were asked to assess the current medical surveillance program for inmates and staff exposed to lead and cadmium during electronics recycling, and to make recommendations for future surveillance. In addition, we were asked to assess past exposures to lead and cadmium, and to investigate the potential for "take-home" exposure. Later we were asked to perform a similar evaluation for the BOP institution in Marianna, Florida. We reviewed medical surveillance records, individual medical records, and industrial hygiene sampling records from each institution. We visited each institution and toured the current and/or former recycling and glass breaking facilities and met with staff and inmates to hear their concerns and present our findings. We also performed industrial hygiene sampling at Elkton and Texarkana. At the time of our site visits, glass breaking was being performed at Elkton and Texarkana, but not at Marianna or Atwater. Letters containing detailed information about our assessment, findings, and recommendations for each facility were sent to the OIG and the warden and union at each facility after each of these evaluations. In August 2009, the OIG forwarded additional data for inmates at Elkton. This report contains a summary of our findings at each institution, a review of the additional biological monitoring for Elkton, and overall conclusions and recommendations. For a copy of the individual letters for each BOP institution, please call 513-841-4382. Facility Evaluations: Federal Correctional Institution Elkton: Electronics recycling at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Elkton appears to have taken place from 1997 until May 2003 without adequate engineering controls, respiratory protection, medical surveillance, or industrial hygiene monitoring. Because of the lack of biological monitoring and industrial hygiene data, we cannot determine the extent of exposure to lead and cadmium that occurred during that time frame, but descriptions of work tasks from staff and inmates indicate that exposures were not well controlled, causing the potential for exposure above occupational exposure limits (OELs) for lead and cadmium. Based upon available sampling results, we determined that the current glass breaking operation (GBO) controls exposure to lead and cadmium to far below occupational exposure limits. The GBO can be further enhanced to limit exposure to those performing glass breaking as well as limiting the migration of lead and cadmium from the GBO into other areas. Results of biological monitoring of staff and inmates since 2003 were unremarkable. While some take-home contamination was documented in inmate cubicles, surface wipe sampling and biological monitoring suggest that take-home contamination did not pose a health threat. In late August 2009, the USDOJ provided biological monitoring data for 10 inmates, 8 of whom were on the roster of inmates performing glass breaking. The results of this monitoring were unremarkable. One inmate glass breaker was tested in early April 2002, prior to the installation of the glass breaking booth in 2003. This inmate is the only individual for whom we have results prior to that time. His blood lead level (BLL) was 5 micrograms per deciliter (microg/dL), and his blood cadmium level (CdB) was 0.7 micrograms per liter. We cannot determine the extent of exposure to lead that occurred in the chip recovery process because of the lack of data. Descriptions of work tasks from staff and a BLL of 5 microg/dL in an inmate 4 months after the process ended indicate that exposure to lead during this process did occur. We found no evidence that actions were taken to prevent exposure to lead at the outset in the chip recovery process and that no medical surveillance was performed until after the process ended. Medical surveillance has not complied with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards. No medical exams (including physical examinations) were done on inmates, staff received inconsistent examinations and biological monitoring by their personal physicians, biological monitoring for lead was not done at standard intervals, and results were not communicated to the inmates. Inappropriate biological monitoring tests such as urine lead and arsenic testing have been done. Records of medical surveillance were not maintained by the employer for the appropriate length of time. After careful review of existing records and current operations, we conclude that the only persons with current potential for exposure to either lead or cadmium over the OSHA action level are the inmates who perform glass breaking or monthly filter change-out. We believe that medical surveillance can be discontinued for all other inmates and staff. Some former inmates and/or staff may require surveillance under the OSHA Cadmium Standard. Federal Correctional Institution Texarkana: Electronics recycling at FCI Texarkana appears to have been performed from late 2001 until May 2004 without appropriate engineering controls, respiratory protection, medical surveillance, or industrial hygiene monitoring. Because of the sparse biological monitoring and industrial hygiene data, we cannot determine the extent of exposure to lead and cadmium that occurred during that time. Descriptions of work tasks from staff and inmates indicate that exposures were not well controlled, causing a potential for exposure above OELs for lead and cadmium. Based on information provided to us and our industrial hygiene sampling, we believe that the current GBO is a significant improvement with respect to controlling worker exposures to cadmium and lead. Some lead- and cadmium-containing dust is still being carried out of the glass breaking booth. Although this does not represent a serious health hazard, it shows a need to maintain good housekeeping throughout the glass breaking area. Exposures since May 2004 are sufficiently low that the OSHA-mandated medical surveillance has not been required since that time. In addition, the results of medical surveillance conducted since 2003 on inmates and staff were generally unremarkable. It is not possible to quantify past exposures to determine whether they triggered the OSHA lead and/or cadmium standard prior to that time. Inmates are advised of the results of their monitoring and see the physician's assistant; however, records of medical surveillance are not maintained by the employer for the appropriate length of time. Some staff have refused to participate in medical surveillance paid by UNICOR but conducted by their personal physicians. After careful review of existing records and current operations, we conclude that medical surveillance can be discontinued for inmates and staff who work in electronics recycling and GBO. UNICOR may choose to continue to perform the limited biological monitoring currently in place as an additional safeguard against excessive exposure and to provide reassurance to inmates and staff. United States Penitentiary Atwater: Inmates were exposed to cadmium and lead above OELs during glass breaking from 2002-2003. It appears that inmates worked without adequate respiratory protection from April 2002 until July 2002. Exposures seem to have been better controlled with relocation of the GBO to the spray booth; however, one sample taken after the relocation demonstrated significant airborne cadmium exposure. Results of medical surveillance of inmates and staff were unremarkable. The medical surveillance program was not in compliance with the...
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(2009) Exposures in sculpture studios at a college art department, Brooklyn College, Brooklyn, New York. (Click to open report) NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Brooklyn College in Brooklyn, New York. The request was to investigate health and safety concerns in the sculpture studios, including the ceramic, woodworking, and metalworking studios. Employees were concerned that degenerative nerve damage, lung cancer, sinus problems, allergies, and headaches were possibly related to work exposures. On October 22-24, 2007, NIOSH investigators conducted an initial evaluation that included an opening ... (Click to show more)NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Brooklyn College in Brooklyn, New York. The request was to investigate health and safety concerns in the sculpture studios, including the ceramic, woodworking, and metalworking studios. Employees were concerned that degenerative nerve damage, lung cancer, sinus problems, allergies, and headaches were possibly related to work exposures. On October 22-24, 2007, NIOSH investigators conducted an initial evaluation that included an opening conference, a tour of the three sculpture studios, observations of work activities, and a review of relevant health and safety documents. We evaluated the ventilation in the studios, collected area and PBZ air samples for VOCs in the woodworking studio, and interviewed employees about their health. On October 24, we held a closing conference to provide preliminary recommendations. On March 28, 2008, we returned to collect area and PBZ welding fume air samples during a metalworking class. We observed inadequate electrical grounding, machine guarding, and spacing around power tools and machines; and poor housekeeping practices. Eating and drinking were allowed in the studios during classes, eye protection was not always used, and respirators were used improperly. Many of the existing health and safety rules and guidelines of the studios were not being enforced. The ventilation system did not mechanically provide supply air to the sculpture studios. PBZ air samples collected for VOCs showed that xylene (0.23 ppm) and toluene (0.04 ppm) were the only compounds measured at quantifiable levels, and their concentrations were well below the NIOSH REL (100 ppm for both xylene and toluene), the OSHA PEL (xylene: 100 ppm; toluene: 200 ppm), and the ACGIH TLV (xylene: 100 ppm; toluene: 20 ppm). All other VOCs were found at trace levels or were not detected. Of the 31 airborne metals and minerals analyzed from welding fumes, most were either not detected or were present at trace concentrations. Six elements were measured in quantifiable concentrations in at least three locations. Zinc was measured in the highest concentration on a PBZ sample of 150 microg/m3. This concentration was well below the NIOSH REL (5000 microg/m3) and the ACGIH TLV (2000 microg/m3) for zinc. All interviewed employees reported concerns about safety issues in the studios. Employees reported past exposures including cadmium, lead, and asbestos exposure in the metalworking studio in the 1980s and unventilated kiln exhaust in the ceramics studio 10 to 12 years ago. Employees reported current use of glues, including methylene chloride, in the woodworking studio. Most studio employees reported intermittent nose and throat irritation, and one reported intermittent headaches at work. Employees also reported concerns about dust exposure, inadequate ventilation, and high noise levels, particularly in the woodworking and metalworking studios. Some employees were also concerned about the risk of developing lung cancer and nervous system disorders from past and current work exposures and reported previous cases in retired faculty. Based on our findings, we conclude that employee reports of nose and throat irritation during work are consistent with particulate and/or irritant exposures. Although the VOCs and solvent levels we measured were below relevant OELs, some employees may still experience symptoms below the OELs. We determined that the neurological disorders and lung cancer in retired studio employees could not be properly assessed due to lack of historical records of exposure, inability to recreate past exposures, and small numbers of cases, making analysis not meaningful. Management should address the sculpture studios' safety issues and improve the ventilation system. The ventilation system should supply adequate outdoor air and provide sufficient make-up air when the hoods and kilns are in use. Although welding fume concentrations were below relevant OELs for specific constituents, NIOSH considers welding fumes a potential human carcinogen and recommends reducing exposures to the lowest feasible level. Management can reduce welding fume exposures by installing adjustable LEV that removes contaminants from the point of generation. Also, ventilation fans and dust collectors that were previously installed to help collect and reduce airborne contaminants should be used when welding or performing dust-generating tasks. We also recommend that management enforce safety rules and improve housekeeping practices.
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(2009) Health concerns at a printed circuit board manufacturing plant, Sanmina-SCI® Corporation, Huntsville, Alabama. (Click to open report) NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Sanmina-SCI Corporation (Sanmina-SCI) located in Huntsville, Alabama. Employees were concerned about exposure to solder paste and fumes during the fabrication, assembly, and testing of printed circuit boards, and noise. Other exposure concerns included copy machine toner, asbestos, mold, and dust. Health effects mentioned in the HHE request included cough, burning eyes, nosebleeds, loss of voice, headache, sinus infection, bronchitis, ... (Click to show more)NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at Sanmina-SCI Corporation (Sanmina-SCI) located in Huntsville, Alabama. Employees were concerned about exposure to solder paste and fumes during the fabrication, assembly, and testing of printed circuit boards, and noise. Other exposure concerns included copy machine toner, asbestos, mold, and dust. Health effects mentioned in the HHE request included cough, burning eyes, nosebleeds, loss of voice, headache, sinus infection, bronchitis, and respiratory problems. On July 9-10, 2007, we conducted our first site visit. We toured the facility to observe work processes and practices, conducted confidential medical interviews with 40 employees, and collected GA air samples for VOCs and surface wipe samples for lead and tin. We reviewed air sampling records, injury and illness records, the respiratory protection program, and MSDSs. We also reviewed the PPE used for the solder dross cleaning operation and the maintenance schedule for the ARUs. We conducted a second site visit on December 12-13, 2007. We collected air samples for lead and specific VOCs. We conducted noise dosimetry at the AI stations, evaluated the room acoustics near ARUs, evaluated the effectiveness of local exhaust hoods for the wave solder and surface mount machines, and collected hand wipe samples to assess lead contamination on skin. We found that a wave solder operator (cleaning wave solder machines) was exposed to an airborne lead concentration of 49 microg/m3, which exceeded the OSHA AL (30 microg/m3) and was close to the OSHA PEL (50 microg/m3). However, during normal wave solder activities, wave solder operators had lead exposures well below the OSHA AL. We found lead on work surfaces and on hands of employees despite hand washing. We also sampled larger surface areas of the break room tables to ensure they were clean but found detectable levels of lead. Air sampling results for specific VOCs indicated that employee exposures were well below all applicable OELs. Full-shift noise exposures for the AI operators in the MS and DAS were well below the NIOSH REL, and the room acoustics were appropriate for the work environment. A consultant's IEQ assessment report from 2007 identified mold in several ARUs, prompting the company to address employee concerns about odors and mold contamination. Our review of air sampling data collected by the company in March 2007 indicated that the airborne carbon black concentrations resulting from Xerox(TM) toner cartridge cleaning were below OELs. We did not evaluate asbestos exposure, another concern listed in the original HHE request, because management informed us that asbestos-containing material was identified and being managed-in-place. Some of the employees we interviewed were concerned about thermal comfort and exposure to dust and solvents. Most interviewed employees did not report work-related symptoms. Furthermore, the upper respiratory symptoms reported by some employees are common in the general population. We recommend following all requirements of the OSHA lead standard (29 CFR 1910.1025). We recommend using engineering controls such as portable exhaust hoods when removing solder dross and cleaning wave solder machines. General housekeeping practices should be improved to keep break rooms and work surfaces clean. We also recommend cleaning and maintaining the ARUs to ensure mold growth does not occur in the future. Additionally, we recommend revising the written respiratory protection program to address inconsistencies between the written program and current employee respirator use.
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(2009) Report on an investigation of asthma and respiratory symptoms among workers at a soy processing plant, The Solae Company, Memphis, Tennessee. (Click to open report) On December 12, 2006, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a confidential Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) request from workers at the Solae Company's plant in Memphis, Tennessee. The requesters described respiratory symptoms and diagnoses, including sinus congestion and asthma, which they attributed to the workplace. They noted exposure to soy materials, lime (calcium oxide (CaO)), microbial contaminants such as mold, and insects. NIOSH investigators conducte... (Click to show more)On December 12, 2006, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a confidential Health Hazard Evaluation (HHE) request from workers at the Solae Company's plant in Memphis, Tennessee. The requesters described respiratory symptoms and diagnoses, including sinus congestion and asthma, which they attributed to the workplace. They noted exposure to soy materials, lime (calcium oxide (CaO)), microbial contaminants such as mold, and insects. NIOSH investigators conducted telephone interviews with workers, a union representative, treating physicians, and company management and safety officials. On March 6, 2007, NIOSH investigators visited the plant to observe the process, measure concentrations of airborne dust, collect bulk samples of soy materials, and interview workers about their symptoms and exposures. They later conducted an industrial hygiene survey (July 9-13 and July 30-August 3, 2007). NIOSH investigators collected personal and area air samples from different plant areas, sub-areas, and jobs during the survey. They collected: personal (breathing-zone) air samples for inhalable dust and inhalable soy antigen; personal (breathing-zone) and area air measurements for airborne dust of respirable and thoracic size fractions using a real-time sampler; and area air samples for inhalable dust, inhalable soy antigen, total dust, total endotoxin, selected metals, and particle size distributions. They also collected bulk samples of soy materials from different sub-areas of the plant. From July 23-August 2, 2007, NIOSH investigators also conducted a medical survey of current workers at the plant; it consisted of an interviewer-administered questionnaire; lung function testing, including spirometry, bronchodilator, and methacholine challenge testing; and skin and blood allergy testing. Inhalable dust exposures were highest for the autopack operator, unloading switch operator, and sanitation job categories. Some of the samples from these job categories, as well as from starch dumping, exceeded the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permissible exposure limit (PEL) for total dust as particulate not otherwise regulated (PNOR) and the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) threshold limit values (TLV) for inhalable dust. The task of starch dumping, which produced the highest dust concentrations measured (21.7 mg/m3), was typically done by workers from several different job categories outside their normal shift work, using respiratory protection. Detectable soy antigen air concentrations were measured in all plant areas and sub-areas; the highest geometric mean inhalable soy antigen area concentration was in the flake processing room (308,000 ng/m3). Job categories with the highest geometric mean soy antigen concentration as measured by personal samples included the unloading switch operator (27,540 ng/m3), curd operator (25,960 ng/m3), and unloading lead (14,360 ng/m3). Currently, there are no occupational exposure standards or guidelines specifically for soybean dusts, though the more general PNOR standard does apply to soybean dusts. The highest endotoxin concentration, 217 EU/m3, was measured in the flake processing room; all other endotoxin concentrations were below 50 EU/m3. Calcium was detected in 5 of 67 total dust air samples; if the calcium in these samples was all present as lime (CaO), the highest corresponding lime concentration in air would have been approximately 0.52 mg/m3, a level well below the existing OSHA standard for lime dust. Of the 281 workers currently employed at the plant by the Solae Company, 147(52%) consented to participate in the medical survey and completed the questionnaire. Participation rates varied by worker classification, ranging from 66 of 94 (70%) production workers to 42 of 114 (37%) non-production workers. NIOSH staff conducted lung function testing for 140 of these workers, skin allergy testing for 132, and blood allergy testing for 135. Participating workers at the Solae plant in Memphis had higher than expected prevalences of physician-diagnosed asthma, sinusitis, and wheeze (a symptom of asthma) compared to the U.S. adult population. The prevalences of current and ever physician-diagnosed asthma for participating males were higher than expected based on a survey of the state of Tennessee, but these differences did not reach statistical significance. Among participants with adult-onset, physician-diagnosed asthma, most were diagnosed after hire at Solae. The incidence rate was five times greater after hire than before hire, consistent with a temporal relationship of occupational exposures preceding asthma diagnosis. Compared to non-production workers, production workers were more likely to report asthma-like symptoms that improve away from work. Work-related asthma-like symptoms were also associated with peak dust concentrations. Compared to workers exposed to lower peak concentrations, participants exposed to higher peak concentrations of dust were more likely to report work-related asthma-like symptoms. Additionally, workers who reported seeing or smelling mold in the workplace were more likely to report work-related sinusitis, nasal allergies, and rash compared to workers not reporting this exposure. Fourteen participants (10%) had airways obstruction on spirometry (six borderline and eight mild or worse severity). Eleven (8%) had spirometry results indicating a restrictive pattern. One had both airways obstruction and restriction. Two had a clinically significant response to bronchodilator and 12, including eight without airways obstruction on spirometry, had evidence of bronchial hyperresponsiveness on methacholine challenge testing. The prevalence of positive immunoglobulin E (IgE) to soy among Solae workers was five times greater than the prevalence among a group of comparison workers who were not occupationally exposed to soy, suggesting that immune recognition of soy among Solae workers resulted from occupational exposures. All asthma outcomes were significantly associated with immune response to soy, as measured by soy-specific IgE levels in the blood but not as measured by the skin prick test for soybean allergy. Concentrations of soy antigen and dust exposure were process-related. Compared to workers exposed to lower peak concentrations, those exposed to higher peak dust concentrations (measured by real-time sampling) were more likely to have spirometry indicating airways obstruction and to report work-related asthma-like symptoms. In addition, level of immunoglobulin G (IgG) to soy was associated with inhalable soy antigen level and work classification. Time-weighted-average inhalable soy antigen and dust concentrations were not associated with asthma outcomes in analyses involving all participants.
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(2008) Exposures to carbon monoxide and surface metals in an Ohio Department of Transportation District Garage, Ohio Department of Transportation, District 8, Main Garage, Wilmington, Ohio. (Click to open report) On August 15, 2006, NIOSH received a request from the OCSEA for a HHE at the ODOT District 8 Main Garage in Wilmington, Ohio. The OCSEA expressed concern about workplace exposure to CO from vehicle exhaust and exposure to metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead that may have accumulated on work surfaces over many years of garage operation. Two NIOSH investigators walked through the worksite on October 31, 2006, to become familiar with the facility and identify potential locations of surface co... (Click to show more)On August 15, 2006, NIOSH received a request from the OCSEA for a HHE at the ODOT District 8 Main Garage in Wilmington, Ohio. The OCSEA expressed concern about workplace exposure to CO from vehicle exhaust and exposure to metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead that may have accumulated on work surfaces over many years of garage operation. Two NIOSH investigators walked through the worksite on October 31, 2006, to become familiar with the facility and identify potential locations of surface contamination with metals. In a follow-up site visit on December 12, 2006, they measured instantaneous CO concentrations using direct reading instruments as the vehicles started-up and left the garage at the beginning of the work shift. They also collected surface wipe samples for arsenic, cadmium, lead, and other metals in work and non-work areas. Although only one of the two garage doors was open and only one of two exhaust fans was operating, all CO measurements were well below the NIOSH recommended ceiling limit of 200 ppm. The highest instantaneous CO concentration of 22.6 ppm occurred when a full-size pickup truck was started and driven out of the garage. Of all the CO measurements, 78% were less than 5 ppm. Because all measured CO concentrations were less than 23 ppm, it is expected that full-shift TWA concentrations would also be well below the NIOSH REL of 35 ppm. No arsenic was detected in any of the surface wipe samples that NIOSH investigators collected. Low concentrations of cadmium were detected on the workbench near the bench grinder in the vehicle maintenance bay and on the workbench near the chain saw sharpener. Cadmium was not detected in any of the other surface wipe samples. High concentrations of surface lead were detected on the bench grinder workbench and chain saw sharpener workbench, and low concentrations were detected on the other work surfaces sampled. Lead was either not detected or was found in trace concentrations on most non-work surfaces, except for low concentrations on the floor near the picnic tables and around the handle of a changing room locker. NIOSH investigators recommend cleaning the workbench surfaces with a HEPA filtered vacuum followed by wet cleaning of the bench surface after each day in which the chain saw sharpener or bench grinder are used. Other work surfaces should be periodically cleaned. Kitchen and break area eating surfaces should be cleaned each day. NIOSH investigators also recommend that employees store personal protective equipment in designated areas and that employees wash their hands thoroughly before eating, drinking, or smoking.
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