Health Hazard Evaluations (HHEs)

(2008) Assessment of physical hazards at an automobile parts manufacturing facility, Tower Automotive, Bluffton, Ohio. (Click to open report)
On May 19, 2003, NIOSH received a union request to conduct an HHE at Tower Automotive in Bluffton, Ohio. The request stated that employees were subjected to highly repetitive work, loud metal stamping noise, and excessive heat in the painting department. The management referred to their employees as colleagues, so this term is used in this report. During an initial site visit (August 21, 2003), NIOSH investigators reviewed documentation of past industrial hygiene and noise sampling and summaries... (Click to show more) On May 19, 2003, NIOSH received a union request to conduct an HHE at Tower Automotive in Bluffton, Ohio. The request stated that employees were subjected to highly repetitive work, loud metal stamping noise, and excessive heat in the painting department. The management referred to their employees as colleagues, so this term is used in this report. During an initial site visit (August 21, 2003), NIOSH investigators reviewed documentation of past industrial hygiene and noise sampling and summaries of audiometric testing conducted at the facility, conducted noise sampling, performed an ergonomic evaluation of jobs that were in operation during our visit, and conducted confidential colleague interviews. During a follow-up site visit (September 13-16, 2004), personal exposure to heat stress and heat strain was assessed in the paint department. Area monitors indicated that the temperature in the paint area was significantly higher than in a comparison area (cafeteria). Six colleagues provided 13 heat strain measures. Of the personal heat strain measures (core body temperature, heart rate, and skin temperature) collected in the paint department (fork lift operators, loaders and unloaders), six measures exceeded the ACGIH core body temperature lower limit (100.4 degrees F), and one exceeded its upper limit (101.3 degrees F). The average heart rate measures were 55-115 beats per minute, and the average skin temperatures ranged from 86 degrees F to 98 degrees F. Nine measures showed signs of dehydration, of which three reached or exceeded the 1.5% guideline for adequate hydration. The ergonomic evaluation found that the 70247 press job presented an occupational hazard; relocation of the bin or other measures to reduce the amount of shoulder abduction and wrist flexion to retrieve parts should be a high priority for the company. Noise levels in the facility were between 85 and 100 dBA. Colleagues were observed wearing hearing protectors consistently and properly. Normal hearing declined from 2002 to 2003. On one of the cut-saw machines, the built-in LEV was not working. Metal shavings were observed all over the work area. During the confidential interviews, colleagues cited musculoskeletal injuries, heat stress from working in the paint department, and dust exposures as main concerns. NIOSH investigators recommend that colleagues working in the paint department rest during the rest portion of the work/rest regiment, and not be assigned any duties during this time. Also, for colleagues performing the 70247 job, the amount of shoulder abduction and wrist flexion to retrieve parts should be reduced. One way to achieve this is by relocating the bin holding parts associated with this job. In the cut-saw area, make sure that the LEV systems function properly, and keep work areas clean. (Click to show less)
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(2008) Employee exposures in a bus maintenance shop, Huntington Coach Corporation, Huntington Station, New York. (Click to open report)
NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at the Huntington Coach Corporation bus repair and body shops, Huntington Station, New York, in November 2006. Employees were concerned that exposures to cleaning solvents, paint vapors, diesel exhaust, and asbestos-containing brake dust were causing skin rashes and respiratory irritation. The request also mentioned possible safety hazards including ignition sources near flammable liquids and use of unsafe vehicle jack stands. On March 15... (Click to show more) NIOSH received a confidential employee request for an HHE at the Huntington Coach Corporation bus repair and body shops, Huntington Station, New York, in November 2006. Employees were concerned that exposures to cleaning solvents, paint vapors, diesel exhaust, and asbestos-containing brake dust were causing skin rashes and respiratory irritation. The request also mentioned possible safety hazards including ignition sources near flammable liquids and use of unsafe vehicle jack stands. On March 15, 2007, we conducted an evaluation that included an opening meeting with management and union representatives, a walk-through survey of the facility's 4th Avenue body shop and 5th Avenue maintenance shop, observations of work practices and PPE use, employee exposure and health assessments, an assessment of building ventilation and potential solvent exposure, and confidential employee interviews. We also collected bulk samples of brake pad pieces and dust samples from the brake rotor lathe and the brake drums and wheels of buses being serviced. We found fiberglass and cellulose in the bulk samples of dust and brake shoes and pads, but no asbestos. In the 5th Avenue maintenance shop, connections between vehicle exhaust pipes and flexible exhaust hoses were loose, and the flexible hoses often did not extend to the outdoors. In the 4th Avenue body shop, a poorly ventilated flammable liquid storage cabinet was overfilled. Two brake cleaners used by the maintenance shop contained tetrachloroethylene, a potential carcinogen. One employee had contact dermatitis that may have been work related. We recommend tightening connections between exhaust pipes and flexible exhaust hoses and increasing the length of the flexible hoses so they extend outdoors to reduce diesel exhaust exposure within the maintenance shop. We recommend using brake cleaners that do not contain tetrachloroethylene and continuing use of brake shoes and pads that contain no asbestos. The flammable liquid storage cabinet should be ventilated and relocated away from potential ignition sources. Huntington Coach should provide nitrile rubber gloves instead of latex gloves to reduce skin contact with fiberglass, grease, and solvents. We recommend that the company ensure that their written respiratory protection program conforms to OSHA requirements and a no-smoking policy is enforced. Employees should be encouraged to report potentially work-related health problems to their supervisors so that workplace problems can be addressed. (Click to show less)
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(2008) Exposures to carbon monoxide and surface metals in an Ohio Department of Transportation District Garage, Ohio Department of Transportation, District 8, Main Garage, Wilmington, Ohio. (Click to open report)
On August 15, 2006, NIOSH received a request from the OCSEA for a HHE at the ODOT District 8 Main Garage in Wilmington, Ohio. The OCSEA expressed concern about workplace exposure to CO from vehicle exhaust and exposure to metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead that may have accumulated on work surfaces over many years of garage operation. Two NIOSH investigators walked through the worksite on October 31, 2006, to become familiar with the facility and identify potential locations of surface co... (Click to show more) On August 15, 2006, NIOSH received a request from the OCSEA for a HHE at the ODOT District 8 Main Garage in Wilmington, Ohio. The OCSEA expressed concern about workplace exposure to CO from vehicle exhaust and exposure to metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead that may have accumulated on work surfaces over many years of garage operation. Two NIOSH investigators walked through the worksite on October 31, 2006, to become familiar with the facility and identify potential locations of surface contamination with metals. In a follow-up site visit on December 12, 2006, they measured instantaneous CO concentrations using direct reading instruments as the vehicles started-up and left the garage at the beginning of the work shift. They also collected surface wipe samples for arsenic, cadmium, lead, and other metals in work and non-work areas. Although only one of the two garage doors was open and only one of two exhaust fans was operating, all CO measurements were well below the NIOSH recommended ceiling limit of 200 ppm. The highest instantaneous CO concentration of 22.6 ppm occurred when a full-size pickup truck was started and driven out of the garage. Of all the CO measurements, 78% were less than 5 ppm. Because all measured CO concentrations were less than 23 ppm, it is expected that full-shift TWA concentrations would also be well below the NIOSH REL of 35 ppm. No arsenic was detected in any of the surface wipe samples that NIOSH investigators collected. Low concentrations of cadmium were detected on the workbench near the bench grinder in the vehicle maintenance bay and on the workbench near the chain saw sharpener. Cadmium was not detected in any of the other surface wipe samples. High concentrations of surface lead were detected on the bench grinder workbench and chain saw sharpener workbench, and low concentrations were detected on the other work surfaces sampled. Lead was either not detected or was found in trace concentrations on most non-work surfaces, except for low concentrations on the floor near the picnic tables and around the handle of a changing room locker. NIOSH investigators recommend cleaning the workbench surfaces with a HEPA filtered vacuum followed by wet cleaning of the bench surface after each day in which the chain saw sharpener or bench grinder are used. Other work surfaces should be periodically cleaned. Kitchen and break area eating surfaces should be cleaned each day. NIOSH investigators also recommend that employees store personal protective equipment in designated areas and that employees wash their hands thoroughly before eating, drinking, or smoking. (Click to show less)
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(2008) Headlee Roofing, Mesa, Arizona. (Click to open report)
On November 15, 2004, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a request from the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers Local 135 to conduct a health hazard evaluation (HHE) for employees of Headlee Roofing in Mesa, Arizona. The request listed silica and noise as potential hazards to roofers. This is one of four HHEs examining silica and noise exposures among roofers in Arizona. On January 11-13, 2005, NIOSH investigators conducted an HHE at... (Click to show more) On November 15, 2004, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received a request from the United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers Local 135 to conduct a health hazard evaluation (HHE) for employees of Headlee Roofing in Mesa, Arizona. The request listed silica and noise as potential hazards to roofers. This is one of four HHEs examining silica and noise exposures among roofers in Arizona. On January 11-13, 2005, NIOSH investigators conducted an HHE at a residential work site in Mesa, Arizona. Dust and noise measurements were taken during residential roofing operations. In addition, bulk samples of tile dust were collected to determine the silica content. NIOSH investigators selected four homes where employees were cutting and laying tiles throughout the day and took noise measurements and simultaneous full-shift personal breathing zone (PBZ) air samples for total and respirable dust. They also evaluated a saw equipped with local exhaust ventilation (LEV) and a saw not equipped with LEV typically used by the workers, using PBZ sampling and real-time monitoring of particle size and particle counts. Noise exposures for all seven roofers exceeded the NIOSH recommended exposure limit. Two employees exceeded the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permissible exposure limit, and all seven employees exceeded the OSHA action limit. The 8-hour time-weighted averages (TWA) for the total dust samples ranged from 1.2 to 5.4 mg/m3. The eight PBZ respirable dust concentrations ranged from 0.32 to 1.8 mg/m3, with a mean of 1.3 mg/m3. The 8-hour TWAs for respirable dust ranged from 0.2 to 1.8 mg/m3. Respirable silica samples ranged from 0.057 to 0.27 mg/m3, with a mean of 0.2 mg/m3. The respirable silica 8-hour TWAs ranged from 0.04 to 0.25 mg/m3. The LEV-equipped saw was not effective in reducing worker exposures to acceptable levels during cutting operations. Medical screening was conducted February 22-24, 2005. Employees from all four roofing companies were invited to participate if they had at least 5 years of experience as a roofer. The medical screening included a questionnaire, lung function test (i.e., spirometry), and a chest x-ray. Of the 118 employees who participated in all three tests, six were from Headlee Roofing. Most roofers who participated in the medical screening had normal lung function. None of those with abnormal lung function had moderate or severe impairments. After controlling for the effects of smoking, NIOSH investigators found that lung function decreased with increasing years of dry cutting cement tiles. No chest x-rays showed findings consistent with silicosis. NIOSH investigators determined that an occupational health hazard due to exposures to respirable silica and noise existed for employees of Headlee Roofing. Recommendations for controlling workplace exposures include reducing or eliminating exposures by implementing engineering controls and enforcing the use of personal protective equipment under the OSHA respirator program guidelines. The employer should develop a training program regarding the potential health hazards of respirable silica exposure and institute a medical monitoring program per the OSHA Special Emphasis Program for Silicosis. Additional recommendations are included at the end of this report. (Click to show less)
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(2008) Radiation exposure to TSA baggage screeners, Transportation Security Administration, Washington, DC. (Click to open report)
Between November 2002 and March 2003, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received three health hazard evaluation (HHE) requests from Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees at the Cincinnati, Honolulu, and Baltimore airports. The employees expressed concerns about a variety of potential exposures including diesel exhaust, dirt, dust, noise, and hazardous items found in baggage. In addition, a concern common to all three requests was exposure to x-ray... (Click to show more) Between November 2002 and March 2003, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) received three health hazard evaluation (HHE) requests from Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees at the Cincinnati, Honolulu, and Baltimore airports. The employees expressed concerns about a variety of potential exposures including diesel exhaust, dirt, dust, noise, and hazardous items found in baggage. In addition, a concern common to all three requests was exposure to x-rays from carry-on baggage and checked baggage screening machines. On March 26, 2003, TSA management submitted a separate request for NIOSH "to perform an independent study to determine the levels of radiation emissions from the various TSA screening equipment, and whether routine use of dosimetry is warranted." In May 2003, the following 12 airports were selected for study: Logan International (BOS); Baltimore-Washington International (BWI); Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky International (CVG); Los Angeles International (LAX); T.F. Green Municipal (PVD); Palm Beach International (PBI); Chicago O'Hare International (ORD); Harrisburg International (MDT); Honolulu International (HNL); McCarren International (LAS); Miami International (MIA); and Philadelphia International (PHL). The objectives of the NIOSH HHE were as follows: (1) assess the work practices, procedures, and training provided to TSA baggage screeners who operated machines that generate x-rays and (2) characterize TSA baggage screeners' radiation exposures and determine if routine monitoring with radiation dosimeters is warranted. Basic characterizations of work practices, spot measurements for radiation, and employee interviews were completed between August 2003 and February 2004. Monthly radiation measurements were obtained from personal dosimeters issued to TSA baggage screeners between March and August 2004. During the basic characterization phase, we observed poor work practices such as employees reaching into the Explosive Detection System (EDS) machines to clear bag jams and employees covering up the emergency stop buttons. We inspected and measured radiation exposure rates for 281 EDS machines. We observed that EDS machines at several airports exhibited a flaw that could be a source of unnecessary radiation exposure to TSA baggage screeners operating these machines. Radiation could leak out of the main gantry housing the computer-aided tomography (CAT) scanner through gaps between the entrance and exit baggage conveyors that appeared because the conveyor belt tunnels on most standalone units were not bolted to the gantry. Workers who frequently have to push odd-sized baggage up the entrance conveyor of the standalone machines are potentially exposed to the radiation present in the gap between the gantry and conveyor belt tunnel. We recommended taking six machines offline because the potential exposures to workers from these machines were equal to or greater than 500 microRoentgen per hour (uR/hour), the Food and Drug Administration's Performance Standard for cabinet x-ray systems. Occupational radiation measurements over a 6-month period from 854 TSA employees included 4024 results from dosimeters worn on the chest (as an estimate of exposure received by the whole body) and 3944 results from dosimeters worn on the wrist. Approximately 89% of the occupational whole body exposures and 88% of the occupational exposures to the wrist were below 1 millirem (mrem). None of the participants' doses in this evaluation exceeded the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permissible exposure limit of 1250 mrem per calendar quarter for individuals present in a restricted area (an area where access is controlled by the employer for purposes of protecting individuals from exposure to radiation or radioactive materials). Furthermore, no doses exceeded 25% of the OSHA quarterly limit which would require employee monitoring. The median estimated 12-month cumulative occupational whole body dose during the period of observation was zero at four of six airports. The highest median estimated 12-month cumulative occupational doses (whole body and wrist) occurred at LAX (14.7 and 15.5 mrem); the other airport with a non-zero median estimated 12-month cumulative dose was BOS (0.4 mrem each for whole body and wrist). Doses for only two out of 854 individuals exceeded the 500 mrem/year estimated cumulative occupational dose, which is the monitoring threshold of the National Radiation Council, and only 13 exceeded an estimated cumulative whole body or wrist dose of 100 mrem/year, which is the monitoring threshold of the Department of Energy. However, because the sample of airports may not be representative, and the study participants were volunteers, these results may not generalize to the entire TSA workforce. Given the strengths and weaknesses of this study, the need for a routine radiation dosimetry program for TSA screeners can neither be justified nor refuted at this time. Approximately 90% of the doses that screeners received were below 1 mrem, but some doses were at levels that warrant further action. Therefore, additional monthly or quarterly dosimetry targeted at specific airports for at least a year may be useful to evaluate the high doses reported in this evaluation. The number of airports and the specific airports for this targeted monitoring are left to the discretion of the TSA. Selection criteria could include airport size, machine type, and orientation of machines (in-line versus standalone). It is recommended that the dosimetry program be managed by a health or medical physicist. To address weaknesses of this study, we also recommend that TSA make participation in the dosimetry program mandatory. (Click to show less)
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